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Abstract
We study model and frame definability of various modal logics. Let ML(u +) denote the
fragment of modal logic extended with the universal modality in which the universal modal-
ity occurs only positively. We show that a class of Kripke models is definable in ML(u +)
if and only if the class is elementary and closed under disjoint unions and surjective bisim-
ulations. We also characterise the definability of ML(u +) in the spirit of the well-known
Goldblatt–Thomason theorem. We show that an elementary class F of Kripke frames is de-
finable inML(u +) if and only if F is closed under taking generated subframes and bounded
morphic images, and reflects ultrafilter extensions and finitely generated subframes. In ad-
dition we study frame definability relative to finite transitive frames and give an analogous
characterisation of ML(u +)-definability relative to finite transitive frames. Finally, we ini-
tiate the study of model and frame definability in team-based logics. We study (extended)
modal dependence logic, (extended) modal inclusion logic, and modal team logic. We es-
tablish strict linear hierarchies with respect to model definability and frame definability,
respectively. We show that, with respect to model and frame definability, the before men-
tioned team-based logics, except modal dependence logic, either coincide with ML(u +) or
plain modal logic ML. Thus as a corollary we obtain model theoretic characterisation of
model and frame definability for the team-based logics.
This article subsumes and extends the conference articles [30] and [31].
Keywords: Model definability, frame definability, team semantics, universal modality,
modal logic.
2010 MSC: 03B45
1. Introduction
Modal logic as a field has progressed far from its philosophical origin, e.g, from the study
of the concepts of necessity and possibility. Modern modal logics are integral parts of both
theoretical research and real life applications in various scientific fields such as mathematics,
artificial intelligence, linguistics, economic game theory, and especially in many subfields of
theoretical and applied computer science. Indeed, the general framework of modal logic has
been found to be remarkably adaptive.
During the last decade there has been an emergence of vibrant research on logics with
team semantics in both first-order and modal contexts. Team semantics was introduced
Email addresses: katsuhiko.sano@gmail.com (Katsuhiko Sano), jonni.virtema@gmail.com (Jonni
Virtema)
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by Hodges [23] in the context of the so-called independence-friendly logic of Hintikka and
Sandu [22]. The fundamental idea behind team semantics is crisp. The idea is to shift from
single assignments to sets of assignments as the satisfying elements of formulas. Va¨a¨na¨nen
[33] adopted team semantics as the core notion for his dependence logic. The syntax of
first-order dependence logic extends the syntax of first-order logic by novel atomic formulas
called dependence atoms. The intuitive meaning of the dependence atom =(x1, . . . , xn, y) is
that inside a team the value of y is functionally determined by the values of x1, . . . , xn. After
the introduction of dependence logic in 2007 the study of related logics with team semantics
has bloomed. One of the most important developments in the area of team semantics was
the introduction of independence logic by Gra¨del and Va¨a¨na¨nen [14] in which dependence
atoms of dependence logic are replaced by independence atoms. Soon after, Galliani [9]
showed that independence atoms can be further analysed, and alternatively expressed, in
terms of inclusion and exclusion atoms.
Different dependency notions, such as functional dependence, independence, and inclu-
sion dependence, are important concepts in many areas of science, and especially in statistics
and database theory. Using the language of database theory, dependence atoms can be in-
terpreted as equality generating dependencies and inclusion dependencies as tuple generating
dependencies, see e.g., a survey of Kolaitis [24] for further information about dependency
notions for schema mappings and data exchange. For first works that directly study the
connection between dependencies in database theory and dependence logics see the works by
Hannula et al. [16, 15, 17]. Also very recently, a connection between a variant of dependence
logic and constraint satisfaction problems has been identified by Hella and Kolaitis [18].
Concurrently a vibrant research on modal and propositional logics with team semantics
has emerged. In the context of modal logic, any subset of the domain of a Kripke model
is called a team. In modal team semantics, formulas are evaluated with respect to team-
pointed Kripke models. The study of modal dependence logic was initiated by Va¨a¨na¨nen
[34] in 2008. Shortly after, extended modal dependence logic (EMDL) was introduced by
Ebbing et al. [8] and modal independence logic by Kontinen et al. [26]. The focus of the
research has been in the computational complexity and expressive power. Hella et al. [19]
established that exactly the properties of teams that have the so-called empty team property,
are downward closed and closed under the so-called team k-bisimulation, for some finite k,
are definable in EMDL. Kontinen et al. [25] have shown that exactly the properties of
teams that are closed under the team k-bisimulation are definable in the so-called modal
team logic, whereas Hella and Stumpf established [20] that the so-called extended modal
inclusion logic is characterised by the empty team property, union closure, and closure
under team k-bisimulation. See the survey [7] for a detailed exposition on the expressive
power and computational complexity of related logics. Whereas the expressive powers of
the related logics have been well-studied, the closely related topics of model and frame
definability have not been addressed before. Here we mend this shortcoming and all but
completely characterise definability of the most studied team-based modal logics.
Modal logic extended with the universal modality (ML(u )) was first formulated by
Goranko and Passy [13]. It extends modal logic by a novel modality u , called the universal
modality, with the following semantics: the formula u ϕ is true in a point w of a model M if
ϕ is true in every point v of the model M. In this article we identify a connection between
particular team-based modal logics and a fragment ofML(u ). We will then characterise the
fragment of ML(u ) with respect to model and frame definability, and use the connection
to team-based logics in order characterise model and frame definability of these team-based
modal logics.
The celebrated Goldblatt–Thomason theorem [11] is a characterisation of modal de-
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finability of elementary (i.e., first-order definable) classes of Kripke frames by four frame
constructions: generated subframes, disjoint unions, bounded morphic images, and ultrafil-
ter extensions. The theorem states that an elementary class of Kripke frames is definable by
a set of modal formulas if and only if the class is closed under taking generated subframes,
disjoint unions and bounded morphic images, and reflects ultrafilter extensions. The origi-
nal proof of Goldblatt and Thomason was algebraic. A model-theoretic version of the proof
was later given by van Benthem [3]. From then on, Goldblatt–Thomason -style theorems
have been formulated for numerous extensions of modal logic such as modal logic with the
universal modality [13], difference logic [10], hybrid logic [32], and graded modal logic [29].
Also restricted versions of frame definability, such as definability within the class of finite
transitive frames [3, 10], have been considered. Also model theoretic characterisations of
definable model classes have been given, e.g., for ML [6] and ML(u ) [28]. For related
work, see also [27].
This paper initiates the study of model and frame definability in the framework of
team semantics. Our contribution is two-fold. Firstly, we give Goldblatt–Thomason -style
theorems for a fragment of modal logic extended with the universal modality; one restricted
to elementary classes and another relative to the class of finite transitive frames. Moreover
we give a characterisation of model definability of this logic. Secondly, we show that there is
a surprising connection between this fragment and particular team-based modal logics. We
also establish surprising strict linear hierarchies with respect to model and frame definability.
Let ML(u +) denote the syntactic fragment of ML(u ) in which the universal modal-
ity occurs only positively. We establish that a class C of Kripke models is definable in
ML(u +) if and only if C is closed under surjective bisimulations and ultraproducts, and
the complement class C is closed under ultrapowers. We show that an elementary class of
Kripke frames is definable in ML(u +) if and only if it is closed under taking generated
subframes and bounded morphic images, and reflects ultrafilter extensions and finitely gen-
erated subframes. Moreover we show that a class F of finite transitive frames is definable
in ML(u +) relative to the class of finite transitive frames if and only if F is closed under
taking generated subframes and bounded morphic images. Finally we establish that with
respect to modal and frame definability a collection of team-based modal logics either coin-
cide withML orML(u +). From this connection we obtain characterisations of model and
frame definability for each of the related team-based modal logics. In addition, we obtain
strict linear hierarchies for both model and frame definability that include each of the logics
studied in this article.
This article is devided in two main parts: Sections 2–6 concentrate in the study of
modal logic with the universal modality and Kripke semantics. In Sections 7–9 logics with
team-semantics are considered. Moreover in Section 9 these two different formalisms are
connected together via model and frame definability.
2. Modal Logic with Universal Modality
In this section we introduce an extension of the basic modal logic with the universal
modality (ML(u )) and present some basic definitions. In addition we present a normal
form for the fragment of ML(u ) in which the universal modality occurs only positively.
2.1. Syntax and semantics
In team-based logics it is customary to define the syntax in negation normal form, that
is to assume that negations occur only in front of proposition symbols. This is due to the
fact that the team semantics negation, that corresponds to the negation used in Kripke
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semantics, is not the contradictory negation of team semantics. Since in this article we
consider extensions of modal logic in the framework of team semantics, we define the syntax
of modal logic also in negation normal form.
Let Φ be a set of atomic propositions. The set of formulas for modal logic ML(Φ) is
generated by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬p | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | (ϕ ∨ ϕ) | ♦ϕ | ϕ, where p ∈ Φ.
The syntax of modal logic with universal modality ML(u )(Φ) is obtained by extending the
syntax of ML(Φ) by the grammar rules
ϕ ::= u ϕ | ♦u ϕ.
The syntax of modal logic with positive universal modality ML(u +)(Φ) is obtained by
extending the syntax of ML(Φ) by the grammar rule
ϕ ::= u ϕ.
As usual, if the underlying set Φ of atomic propositions is clear from the context, we drop
“(Φ)” and just writeML,ML(u ), etc. We also use the shorthands ¬ϕ, ϕ→ ψ, and ϕ↔ ψ.
By ¬ϕ we denote the formula that can be obtained from ¬ϕ by pushing all negations to
the atomic level, and by ϕ → ψ and ϕ ↔ ψ, we denote (¬ϕ ∨ ψ) and (ϕ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ),
respectively.
A (Kripke) frame is a pair F = (W,R) where W , called the domain of F, is a non-empty
set and R ⊆ W ×W is a binary relation on W . By Fall, we denote the class of all frames.
We use |F| to denote the domain of the frame F. Let Φ be a set of proposition symbols. A
(Kripke) Φ-model is a tuple M = (W,R, V ), where (W,R) is a frame and V : Φ → P(W )
is a valuation of the proposition symbols. By Mall(Φ), we denote the class of all Φ-models.
The semantics of modal logic, i.e., the satisfaction relation M, w  ϕ, is defined via pointed
Φ-models as usual, see, e.g., [4]. For the universal modality u and its dual ♦u , we define
M, w  u ϕ ⇔ M, v  ϕ, for every v ∈ W,
M, w  ♦u ϕ ⇔ M, v  ϕ, for some v ∈ W.
We say that formulas ϕ and ψ are equivalent in Kripke semantics (ϕ ≡K ψ), if the equiva-
lence M, w  ϕ ⇔ M, w  ψ holds for every model M = (W,R, V ) and every w ∈ W . If
ϕ ∈ ML(u )(Φ) is a Boolean combination of formulas beginning with u , we say that ϕ is
closed.
A formula set Γ is valid in a model M = (W,R, V ) (notation: M  Γ), if M, w  ϕ
holds for every w ∈ W and every ϕ ∈ Γ. The set Γ is valid in a class C of models (written:
C  Γ) if M  Γ for every M ∈ C. When Γ is a singleton {ϕ }, we simply write M  ϕ
and C  ϕ. Similarly, a formula set Γ is valid in a frame F = (W,R) (notation: F  Γ), if
Γ is valid in every model of the form (F, V ). A set Γ of L-formulas is valid in a class F of
frames (written: F  Γ) if F  Γ for every F ∈ F. Again when Γ is a singleton {ϕ }, we
simply write F  ϕ and F  ϕ.
2.2. Definability
Let L(Φ) and L′(Φ′) be modal logics such that the validity relation for Kripke models
(i.e., M  Γ) is defined. Given a set Γ of L(Φ)-formulas, we define
Mod(Γ) := {M ∈Mall(Φ) |M  Γ } and Fr(Γ) := {F ∈ Fall |F  Γ } .
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We say that Γ defines a class C of models (frames), if C = Mod(Γ) (C = Fr(Γ)). When
Γ is a singleton {ϕ }, we simply say that ϕ defines C. A class C of models (frames) is
L(Φ)-definable if there exists a set Γ of L(Φ)-formulas such that Mod(Γ) = C (Fr(Γ) = C).
We write L(Φ) ≤M L′(Φ), if every L(Φ)-definable class of models is also L′(Φ)-definable.
We write L(Φ) =M L′(Φ), if both L(Φ) ≤M L′(Φ) and L′(Φ) ≤M L(Φ) hold, and write
L(Φ) <M L′(Φ), if L(Φ) ≤M L′(Φ) but L′(Φ) 6≤M L(Φ). Analogously, we write L(Φ) ≤F
L′(Φ′), if every L(Φ)-definable class of frames is also L′(Φ′)-definable. We write L(Φ) =F
L′(Φ′), if both L(Φ) ≤F L
′(Φ′) and L′(Φ′) ≤F L(Φ) hold, and write L(Φ) <F L
′(Φ′) if
L(Φ) ≤F L′(Φ′) but L′(Φ′) 6≤F L(Φ).
A class C of Φ-models is called elementary if there exists a set of first-order sentences
with equality of the vocabulary Φ ∪ {R} that defines C. A class F of frames is called
elementary if there exists a set of first-order sentences with equality of the vocabulary {R}
that defines C.
It is well-known that, via the so-called standard translation, formulas of modal logic can
be translated to formulas of first-order logic with one free variable. This translation also
geneneralises to ML(u ). Thus it follows that every ML(u )-definable class of models is
elementary. However this does not hold for classes of frames for the obvious reason; in
frame definability the univeral quantification of valuations corresponds to quantification of
sets and thus the corresponding translation is to monadic second-order logic.
Definition 1 (Standard translation). Let x be a first-order variable. The standard trans-
lation STx that maps formulas of ML(u )(Φ) to formulas of FO({R} ∪ Φ) is defined as
follows:
STx(p) =P (x),
STx(¬p) =¬P (x),
STx(ϕ ∨ ψ) =STx(ϕ) ∨ STx(ψ),
STx(ϕ ∧ ψ) =STx(ϕ) ∧ STx(ψ),
STx(♦ϕ) =∃y
(
R(x, y) ∧ STy(ϕ)
)
,
STx(ϕ) =∀y
(
R(x, y)→ STy(ϕ)
)
,
STx(♦u ϕ) =∃xSTx(ϕ),
STx(u ϕ) =∀xSTx(ϕ),
where y is a fresh variable.
The proof of the following proposition is self-evident; for basic modal logic ML see [4,
Proposition 2.47].
Proposition 2. Let ϕ be an ML(u )-formula.
1. For every M and every point w of M: M, w  ϕ iff M |=FO STx(ϕ)[w].
2. For every M: M  ϕ iff M |=FO ∀xSTx(ϕ).
Here |=FO denotes the satisfaction relation of first-order logic.
2.3. Normal Form
We will next define a normal form for ML(u +). This normal form is a modification of
the normal form for ML(u ) by Goranko and Passy in [13].
Definition 3. (i) A formula ϕ is a disjunctive u -clause if there exists a natural number
n ∈ ω and formulas ψ, ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ML such that ϕ = ψ ∨u ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨u ψn.
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(ii) A formula ϕ is in conjunctive u -form if ϕ is a conjunction of disjunctive u -clauses.
(i) A formula ϕ is a conjunctive u -clause if there exists formulas ψ, θ ∈ ML such that
ϕ = ψ ∧u θ.
(ii) A formula ϕ is in disjunctive u -form if ϕ is a disjunction of conjunctive u -clauses.
(iii) A formula ϕ is in u -form if ϕ is either in conjunctive u -form or in disjunctive u -form.
It is easy to show that for each ML(u +)-formula in conjunctive u -form there exists an
equivalent ML(u +)-formula in disjunctive u -form, and vice versa.
Recall that ϕ ∈ML(u )(Φ) is closed if it is a Boolean combination of formulae beginning
with u .
Proposition 4. Let ϕ, ψ ∈ML(u ) such that ψ is closed. Then,
1. (ϕ ∨ ψ) ≡K (ϕ ∨ ψ),
2. ♦(ϕ ∧ ψ) ≡K (♦ϕ ∧ ψ),
3. u (ϕ ∨ ψ) ≡K (u ϕ ∨ ψ).
Proof. Cases 1 and 3 follow from [13, Proposition 3.6]. Case 2 is completely analogous to
case 1.
Theorem 5. For each ML(u +)-formula ϕ, there exists an ML(u +)-formula ψ in u -form
such that ϕ ≡K ψ.
Proof. The proof is done by induction on ϕ. The cases for literals and connectives are
trivial. As for the case ϕ = ψ, we proceed as follows. By induction hypothesis there
exists a conjunctive u -form
∧
i∈I ψi, where each ψi is a disjunctive u -clause, such that∧
i∈I ψi ≡K ψ. By the semantics of , we then have that
ψ ≡K 
∧
i∈I
ψi ≡K
∧
i∈I
ψi.
Now since each ψi is a disjunctive u -clause, it follows from case 1 of Proposition 4 that, for
each i ∈ I, the formula ψi is equivalent to some disjunctive u -clause ψ
′
i. Thus
∧
i∈I ψ
′
i is
a conjunctive u -form that is equivalent to ψ.
The proof for the case of u ϕ is otherwise the same as the proof for the case ϕ, but
instead of item 1 of Proposition 4, item 3 is used. The proof for the case ♦ϕ is likewise
analogous to that of ϕ. The proof uses a disjunctive u -form instead of the conjunctive
one and item 2 of Proposition 4 instead of item 1.
3. Definability in Modal Logics with Universal modality
In this section we characterise the definability of the logics introduced in Section 2 with
respect to (non-pointed) models. We start by introducing the well-known concepts; disjoint
unions and bisimulations.
Definition 6 (Disjoint Union). Let {Mi | i ∈ I } be a pairwise disjoint family of Φ-models,
where Mi = (Wi, Ri, Vi). The disjoint union
⊎
i∈I Mi = (W,R, V ) of {Mi | i ∈ I } is defined
by W =
⋃
i∈I Wi, R =
⋃
i∈I Ri, and V (p) =
⋃
i∈I Vi(p), for each p ∈ Φ.
Definition 7 (Bisimulation). Let M = (W,R, V ) and M′ = (W ′, R′, V ′) be Φ-models. A
nonempty relation Z ⊆W ×W ′ is called a bisimulation if for each (w,w′) ∈ Z it holds that
1. M, w  p⇔M′, w′  p, for each p ∈ Φ,
2. for each v ∈ W s.t. wRv there exists v′ ∈ W ′ s.t. w′R′v′ and vZv′,
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3. for each v′ ∈ W ′ s.t. w′R′v′ there exists v ∈ W s.t. wRv and vZv′.
If the domain of Z is W , we call Z total, and if the range of Z is W ’, we say that Z is
surjective.
It is well-known that for pointed models and basic modal logicML bisimulation implies
modal equivalence. Moreover with respect to modal definability, we have the following
characterisation. Ultraproducts and ultrapowers are standard notions of first-order model
theory, see e.g., the book of Chang and Keisler [5]. In this paper these notions are used
in order to build ω-saturated and elementary equivalent models (again standard notions of
first-order model theory, see e.g., Chang and Keisler) from given Kripke models.
Theorem 8 ([6, 28]). Let C be a class of Kripke models. The following equivalences hold:
1. The class C is definable inML if and only if C is closed under surjective bisimulations,
disjoint unions and ultraproducts, and C is closed under ultrapowers.
2. The class C is definable in ML(u ) if and only if C is closed under total surjective
bisimulations and ultraproducts, and C is closed under ultrapowers.
It is well-known (see, e.g., [5]) that a class of models C is elementary if and only if
it is closed under isomorphisms and ultraproducts, while its complement is closed under
ultrapowers. Thus the above theorem may be rewritten as follows:
Corollary 9. Let C be a class of Kripke models. The following equivalences hold:
1. The class C is definable in ML if and only if C is elementary and closed under
surjective bisimulations and disjoint unions.
2. The class C is definable in ML(u ) if and only if C is elementary and closed under
total surjective bisimulations.
We will next establish corresponding characterisations forML(u +). Recall that a closed
disjunctive u -clause is a formula of the form
∨
i∈I 
u ϕi, where, for each i ∈ I, ϕi ∈ML.
Definition 10. By
∨
u ML we denote the set of all closed disjunctive u -clauses.
Lemma 11. For each ML(u +)-formula ϕ, there exists a finite set Γ of closed disjunctive
u -clauses such that M  ϕ iff M  Γ, for every model M.
Proof. Let ϕ be anML(u +)-formula. By Theorem 5, we may assume that ϕ is a conjunctive
u -form
∧
i∈I ψi, where each ψi := γi ∨
∨
j∈Ji
u δj is a disjunctive u -clause. By item 3 of
Proposition 4, for each i ∈ I, u ψi is equivalent to the closed disjunctive u -clause ψ′i :=
u γi ∨
∨
j∈Ji
u δj . Thus, for every model M,
M 
∧
i∈I
ψi ⇔M  {ψi | i ∈ I} ⇔M  {u ψi | i ∈ I} ⇔M  {ψ
′
i | i ∈ I}.
Proposition 12. A class C of Kripke models is definable inML(u +) if only if C is definable
in
∨
u ML.
Proof. The direction
∨
u ML ≤M ML(u
+) is trivial. We will establish thatML(u +) ≤M∨
u ML. Consider any ML(u +)-definable class of models C. Let Γ be a set of ML(u +)
formulas that defines C. By Lemma 11, for each ϕ ∈ Γ, there is a finite set ∆ϕ of closed
disjunctive u -clauses such that M  ϕ iff M  ∆ϕ, for every Kripke model M. It follows
that M  Γ iff M 
⋃
ϕ∈Γ∆ϕ, for every Kripke model M. Therefore
⋃
ϕ∈Γ∆ϕ defines C as
desired.
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Proposition 13. Let M andM′ be Kripke models such that there is a surjective bisimulation
from M to M′, and let ϕ be an ML(u +)-formula. If M  ϕ then M′  ϕ.
Proof. Let Z ⊆ W × W ′ be a surjective bisimulation. We show by structural induction
that for every ϕ ∈ ML(u +) and (w,w′) ∈ Z, it holds that, if M, w  ϕ then M′, w′  ϕ,
from which the claim follows. The cases for (negated) propositional symbols, Boolean
connectives, and the modalities ♦ and  are standard. We show the case for u . Assume
that M, w  u ϕ. Now, for every v ∈ dom(Z), it holds that M, v  ϕ. Thus, by induction
hypothesis, M′, v′  ϕ, for every v′ ∈ ran(Z) = W ′. Thus M′, w′  u ϕ.
Lemma 14 ([28]). Let M and M′ be ω-saturated Kripke models. Assume that, for every
ϕ ∈ ML, M  ϕ implies M′  ϕ. Then there exists a surjective bisimulation from M to
M′.
The following result was essentially stated in the conclusion of [6]. We present a detailed
proof.
Theorem 15. A class C of models is definable in
∨
u ML if and only if C is closed under
surjective bisimulations and ultraproducts, and C is closed under ultrapowers.
Proof. Let C be a class of models definable in
∨
u ML. Via standard translation (Proposi-
tion 2), we get that C is elementary and thus C is closed under ultraproducts and C is closed
under ultrapowers. By Propositions 12 and 13, C is closed under surjective bisimulations.
Assume that C is closed under surjective bisimulations and ultraproducts, and that C
is closed under ultrapowers. Define
S := {ϕ ∈
∨
u ML | C  ϕ}
We will show that S defines C. Clearly C ⊆ Mod(S), thus we show the converse. LetM be a
model such that M  S. Let U be some ultrafilter over N that includes all cofinite subsets of
N (for the existence of such ultrafilter, the reader is referred to, e.g., [5, Proposition 3.3.6])
and put M′ = ΠUM. Clearly U is a countably incomplete ultrafilter over N (an ultrafilter is
countably incomplete if it is not closed under countable intersections). Note that M and M′
are elementary equivalent (see, e.g., [4, Corollary A.20]), and thus via standard translation
(Proposition 2) M′  S. Define
∆ := {ϕ ∈
∨
u ML |M′  ϕ}.
Define ∆ :=
∨
u ML \∆. For each γ ∈ ∆, γ is falsifiable in C, i.e., there exists a model
M ∈ C such thatM 6 γ. For if not, γ ∈ ∆ is in S (and thus in ∆), a contradiction. Since the
logics we consider have only countably many formulas, we may write ∆ = {γ1, . . . , γk, . . . }.
Since ∆ is closed under disjunctions, for each k ∈ N, γ1 ∨ · · · ∨ γk is falsifiable in C. So, for
each k ∈ N, let us fix a model M′k ∈ C such that M
′
k 6 γ1 ∨ · · · ∨ γk. Note that for every
formula ϕ ∈
∨
u ML and Kripke model N, N 6 ϕ iff N  ¬ϕ. Thus M′k  ¬(γ1∨ · · · ∨ γk).
Recall that U contains all cofinite subsets of N. It is easy to check that, by  Los´’s theorem
(see, e.g., [4, Theorem A.19]), ΠUM
′
k  ¬γ, for each γ ∈ ∆. Thus ΠUM
′
k 6 γ, for each
γ ∈ ∆.
Recall that U is countably incomplete. By [5, Theorem 6.1.1] it follows that ΠUM
′
k
and M′ = ΠUM are ω-saturated. Next we show that, for every ψ ∈ ML, if ΠUM′k  ψ
then M′  ψ. By Lemma 14 it then follows that there exists a surjective bisimulation from
ΠUM
′
k to M
′. Assume that M′ 6 ψ. Thus M′ 6 u ψ. Now clearly u ψ ∈ ∆, and thus
ΠUM
′
k 6 u ψ. It then follows that ΠUM
′
k 6 ψ.
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We are now ready to finalise the proof. Recall that, for each k ∈ N, the model M′k ∈ C.
By assumption C is closed under ultraproducts and thus ΠUM
′
k ∈ C. Now since C is closed
under surjective bisimulations, we obtain that M′ ∈ C. Recall that M′ = ΠUM and that C
is closed under ultrapowers, thus we conclude that M ∈ C.
Now together with Proposition 12, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 16. A class C of models is definable inML(u +) if and only if C is closed under
surjective bisimulations and ultraproducts, and C is closed under ultrapowers.
Analogously to Corollary 9, we obtain the following:
Corollary 17. A class C of models is definable in ML(u +) if and only if C is elementary
and closed under surjective bisimulations.
With the help of the characterisations above, it is easy to show that the following strict
hierarchy follows.
Proposition 18. ML <M ML(u
+) <M ML(u ).
Proof. ML <M ML(u
+): Let C be the class of {p}-models that is defined by theML(u +)-
formula u p ∨ u ¬p. It is self-evident that C is not closed under disjoint unions. Thus, by
Theorem 8, C is not ML-definable.
ML(u +) <M ML(u ): Let C be the class of {p}-models that is defined by theML(u )-
formula ♦u p. It is self-evident that C is not closed under surjective bisimulations. Thus, by
Theorem 16, C is not ML(u +)-definable.
4. Modal Frame Definability
In this section we compareML,ML(u +), andML(u ) with respect to frame definabil-
ity. It is easy to see thatML ≤F ML(u
+) ≤F ML(u ). To show that the two occurrences
of ≤F here are strict, let us introduce two frame constructions.
Definition 19 (Disjoint Unions). Let {Fi | i ∈ I } be a pairwise disjoint family of frames,
where Fi = (Wi, Ri). The disjoint union
⊎
i∈I Fi = (W,R) of {Fi | i ∈ I } is defined by
W =
⋃
i∈I Wi and R =
⋃
i∈I Ri.
Definition 20 (Generated Subframes). Given any two frames F = (W,R) and F = (W ′, R′),
F′ is a generated subframe of F if (i) W ′ ⊆ W , (ii) R′ = R ∩ (W ′)2, (iii) w′Rv′ implies
v′ ∈ W ′, for every w′ ∈ W ′. We say that F′ is the generated subframe of F by X ⊆ |F|
(notation: FX) if F
′ is the smallest generated subframe of F whose domain contains X. F′
is a finitely generated subframe of F if there is a finite set X ⊆ |F| such that F′ is FX .
It is well-known that everyML-definable frame class is closed under taking both disjoint
unions and generated subframes (see [4, Theorem 3.14 (i), (ii)]). However this is not the case
for every ML(u )-definable nor every ML(u +)-definable class; see the following example.
Example 21. Consider the following examples from [13, p.14]: the formula ¬p∨u p defines
the class {(W,R) ∈ Fall | |W | = 1}, whereas the formula ♦u ♦(p ∨ ¬p) defines the class
{(W,R) ∈ Fall | R 6= ∅}. Clearly, the former is not closed under taking disjoint unions, and
the latter is not closed under taking generated subframes. Note that both of the classes above
are elementary.
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The above example shows that there exists anML(u +)-definable class that is not closed
under taking disjoint unions and that there exists an ML(u )-definable class that is not
closed under taking generated subframes. Thus we obtain thatML <F ML(u
+). Next we
will next establish that everyML(u +)-definable frame class is closed under taking generated
subframes. From this we get that ML(u +) <F ML(u ).
First note that the following result follows directly from Proposition 12.
Proposition 22. A class F of Kripke frames is definable inML(u +) if only if it is definable
in
∨
u ML.
Proposition 23. Let F be a frame and ϕ ∈
∨
u ML. If F  ϕ, then G  ϕ for all
generated subframes G of F.
Proof. Fix any generated subframe G of a frame F and put ϕ :=
∨
i∈I 
u ψi. Suppose that
F  ϕ. To show G  ϕ, fix any valuation V and any state w in G. We show that (G, V ), w 
u ψi for some i ∈ I. Since we can regard V as a valuation on F, (F, V ), w 
∨
i∈I 
u ψi. Thus
there is some i ∈ I such that (F, V ), u  ψi, for every u ∈ |F|. Fix such i ∈ I. Since
ψi is in ML and the satisfaction of ML is invariant under taking generated submodels
(cf. [4, Proposition 2.6]), (G, V ), u  ψi for every u ∈ G. Therefore, (G, V ), w  u ψi, as
desired.
The following proposition follows directly by Propositions 22 and 23.
Proposition 24. Every ML(u +)-definable frame class is closed under taking generated
subframes.
Now recall that, by Example 21,ML(u +) is not closed under taking disjoint unions and
ML(u ) is not closed under generated submodels. Furthermore recall that, by Proposition
22, ML(u +) =F
∨
u ML. The following strict hierarchy follows.
Proposition 25. ML <F ML(u
+) =F
∨
u ML <F ML(u ). Moreover, the same holds
when we restrict ourselves to elementary frame classes.
5. Goldblatt–Thomason -style Theorem for ML(u +)
In addition to disjoint unions and generated subframes, we introduce two more frame
constructions. With the help of these four constructions, we first review the existing charac-
terisations ofML- andML(u )-definability when restricted to the elementary frame classes.
We then give a novel characterisation of ML(u +)-definability again restricted to the ele-
mentary frame classes.
Definition 26 (Bounded Morphism). Given any two frames F = (W,R) and F′ = (W ′, R′),
a function f : W →W ′ is a bounded morphism if it satisfies the following two conditions:
(Forth) If wRv, then f(w)R′f(v).
(Back) If f(w)R′v′, then wRv and f(v) = v′ for some v ∈ W .
If f is surjective, we say that F′ is a bounded morphic image of F.
Definition 27 (Ultrafilter Extensions). Let F = (W,R) be a Kripke frame, and Uf(W )
denote the set of all ultrafilters on W . Define the binary relation Rue on the set Uf(W )
as follows: URueU ′ iff X ∈ U ′ implies mR(X) ∈ U , for every X ⊆ W , where mR(X) :=
{w ∈ W |wRw′ for some w′ ∈ X }. The frame ueF = (Uf(W ), Rue) is called the ultrafilter
extension of F.
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A frame class F reflects ultrafilter extensions if ueF ∈ F implies F ∈ F for every frame
F. It is well-known that every ML- orML(u )-definable frame class is closed under taking
bounded morphic images and reflects ultrafilter extensions (cf. [4, Theorem 3.14, Corollary
3.16 and Exercise 7.1.2]).
Theorem 28 (Goldblatt–Thomason theorems for ML [11] and ML(u ) [13]). (i) An ele-
mentary frame class isML-definable if and only if it is closed under taking bounded morphic
images, generated subframes, disjoint unions and reflects ultrafilter extensions.
(ii) An elementary frame class is ML(u )-definable if and only if it is closed under taking
bounded morphic images and reflects ultrafilter extensions.
In order to characterise ML(u +)-definability of elementary frame classes, we need to
introduce the following notion of reflection of finitely generated subframes: a frame class F
reflects finitely generated subframes whenever it is the case for all frames F that, if every
finitely generated subframe of F is in F, then F ∈ F.1 In what follows, we show that
everyML(u +)-definable class of Kripke frames reflects finitely generated subframes via the
following intermediate result for
∨
u ML.
Proposition 29. Let F be a frame and ϕ ∈
∨
u ML. If G  ϕ for all finitely generated
subframes G of F, then F  ϕ.
Proof. We show the contrapositive implication. Let ϕ be
∨
i∈I 
u ψi and suppose that F 6∨
i∈I 
u ψi. Now, we can find a valuation V and a state w such that (F, V ), w 6 u ψi for
all i ∈ I. Thus, for each i ∈ I, there is a state wi such that (F, V ), wi 6 ψi. Define X :=
{wi | i ∈ I } and note that X is finite. Consider the submodel (FX , VX) of F generated by
X . Since for each i ∈ I, (F, V ), wi 6 ψi and ψi ∈ ML, and since the satisfaction of ML is
invariant under generated submodels (cf. [4, Proposition 2.6]), it follows that (FX , VX), wi 6
ψi for each i ∈ I. Thus (FX , VX) 6 u ψi for each i ∈ I. Hence (FX , VX) 6
∨
i∈I 
u ψi, which
implies our goal FX 6
∨
i∈I 
u ψi.
The fact that everyML(u +)-definable class reflects finitely generated subframes follows
by Propositions 22 and 29.
Proposition 30. EveryML(u +)-definable class of Kripke frames reflects finitely generated
subframes.
Whereas the original Goldblatt–Thomason theorem for basic modal logic was proved via
duality between algebras and frames [11], our proof of Goldblatt–Thomason -style theorem
modifies the model-theoretic proof given by van Benthem [3] for basic modal logic.
Definition 31 (Satisfiability). Let Γ be a set of formulas, M a model and F a class of
frames. We say that Γ is satisfiable in M if there exists a point w of M such that M, w  γ
for all γ ∈ Γ. We say that Γ is finitely satisfiable in M if each finite subset of Γ is satisfiable
in M. We say that Γ is satisfiable in F if there exists a frame F ∈ F and a valuation V on
F such that Γ is satisfiable in (F, V ). Finally, we say that Γ is finitely satisfiable in F if
each finite subset of Γ is satisfiable in F.
Theorem 32. Given any elementary frame class F, the following are equivalent:
1Closure under generated subframes and reflection of finitely generated subframes characterise the defin-
ability of hybrid logic with satisfaction operators and downarrow binder when restricted elementary frame
classes [1, Theorem 26].
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(i) F is ML(u +)-definable.
(ii) F is closed under taking generated subframes and bounded morphic images, and reflects
ultrafilter extensions and finitely generated subframes.
Proof. The direction from (i) to (ii) follows directly by Propositions 24 and 30, and Theorem
28. In the proof of the converse direction, we use some notions from first-order model theory
such as elementary extensions and ω-saturation. The reader unfamiliar with them is referred
to [5]. Assume (ii) and define Log(F) :=
{
ϕ ∈ML(u +) |F  ϕ
}
. We show that, for any
frame F, F ∈ F iff F  Log(F).
Consider any F = (W,R). It is trivial to show the Only-If-direction, and so we show
the If-direction. Assume that F  Log(F). To show F ∈ F, we may assume, without loss of
generality, that F is finitely generated. This is because: otherwise, it would suffice to show,
since F reflects finitely generated subframes, that G ∈ F for all finitely generated subframes
G of F (note that G  Log(F) by Proposition 24). Let U be a finite generator of F. Let
us expand our syntax with a (possibly uncountable) set { pA |A ⊆W } of new propositional
variables and define ∆ to be the set containing exactly:
pA∩B ↔ pA ∧ pB, pW\A ↔ ¬pA, pmR(A) ↔ ♦pA, pW ,
where A,B ⊆ W and recall that mR(A) := {x ∈ W | xRy for some y ∈ A } (cf. Defini-
tion 27). Define
∆F,u := {p{u} ∧
nϕ | n ∈ ω and ϕ ∈ ∆},
for each u ∈ U . Recall that F is finitely generated by U . The intuition here is that (∆F,u)u∈U
provides a “complete enough description” of F.
Let us introduce a finite set {xu|u ∈ U} of variables in first-order syntax and let STxu be
the standard translation fromML(u +) to the corresponding first-order logic via the variable
xu, see Definition 1. We will show that
⋃
u∈U{STxu(ϕ) |ϕ ∈ ∆F,u} is satisfiable in F in the
sense of the satisfaction in first-order model theory. Since F is elementary, it follows from
the compactness of first-order logic that it suffices to show that
⋃
u∈U{STxu(ϕ) |ϕ ∈ ∆F,u}
is finitely satisfiable in F. Let Γ be a finite subset of this set. Then, we may write Γ =⋃
1≤k≤n STxuk [Γuk ] for some u1, . . . , un ∈ U and some finite Γuk ⊆ ∆F,uk (1 ≤ k ≤ n).
Assume, for the sake of a contradiction, that Γ is not satisfiable in F. It follows that F  ϑ
in the sense of modal logic, where ϑ :=
∨
1≤k≤n
u ¬
∧
Γuk . Since ϑ is an ML(u
+)-formula,
it belongs to Log(F). Thus by the assumption F  Log(F), we conclude that F  ϑ; and
therefore Γ is not satisfiable in F in the sense of first-order model theory. However, Γ is
clearly satisfiable in F under the natural structure interpreting pA as A and the natural
assignment sending xu to u. This is a contradiction. Therefore,
⋃
u∈U{STxu(ϕ) |ϕ ∈ ∆F,u}
is satisfiable in F.
Let G ∈ F be such that
⋃
u∈U{STxu(ϕ) |ϕ ∈ ∆F,u} is satisfiable in G. Let us fix a
valuation V and a finite set Z := {wu|u ∈ U} of points such that
⋃
u∈U{STxu(ϕ) |ϕ ∈ ∆F,u}
is satisfied in (G, V ) under an assignment sending each xu to wu. Then, (G, V ), wu  ∆F,u.
Now let (G∗Z , V
∗
Z ) denote some ω-saturated elementary extension of the Z generated sub-
model of (G, V ). It is easy to check that (G∗Z , V
∗
Z ), w
∗
u  ∆F,u where w
∗
u is the corresponding
element in G∗Z to wu of GZ and that (G
∗
Z , V
∗
Z )  ∆. Since F is elementary and closed under
taking generated subframes, we conclude first that GZ ∈ F and then that G∗Z ∈ F. We can
now prove the following claim.
Claim 1. The ultrafilter extension ueF is a bounded morphic image of G∗Z .
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By closure of F under bounded morphic images, we oftain ueF ∈ F. Finally, since F reflects
ultrafilter extensions, F ∈ F, as required.
(Proof of Claim) Define a mapping f : |G∗Z | → Uf(W ) (where Uf(W ) is the set of all
ultrafilters on W ) by
f(s) := {A ⊆W | (G∗Z , V
∗
Z ), s  pA } .
We will show that (a) f(s) is an ultrafilter on W ; (b)f is a bounded morphism; (c) f is
surjective. Below, we denote by S the underlying binary relation of G∗Z .
(a) f(u) is an ultrafilter: Follows immediately from the fact that (G∗Z , V
∗
Z )  ∆.
(b1) f satisfies (Forth): We show that sSs′ implies f(s)Ruef(s′). Assume that sSs′. By
the definition of Rue, it suffices to show that A ∈ f(s′) implies mR(A) ∈ f(s). Suppose
A ∈ f(s′). Thus (G∗Z , V
∗
Z ), s
′  pA. Since sSs
′, we obtain (G∗Z , V
∗
Z ), s  ♦pA. Since
(G∗Z , V
∗
Z )  ∆, (G
∗
Z , V
∗
Z )  ♦pA ↔ pmR(A). Therefore (G
∗
Z , V
∗
Z ), s  pmR(A), and hence
mR(A) ∈ f(s), as desired.
(b2) f satisfies (Back): We show that f(s)RueU implies sSs′ and f(s′) = U for some
s′ ∈ |G∗Z |. Assume that f(s)R
ueU . We will find a state s′ such that sSs′ and
(G∗Z , V
∗
Z ), s
′  pA for all A ∈ U . By ω-saturation, it suffices to show that { pA |A ∈ U }
is finitely satisfiable in the set { t ∈ |G∗Z| | sSt} of the successors of s. Take any A1,
. . ., An ∈ U . Then,
⋂
1≤i≤nAi ∈ U . Now since f(s)R
ueU , mR(
⋂
1≤i≤nAi) ∈ f(s).
Hence (G∗Z , V
∗
Z ), s  pmR(
⋂
1≤i≤n Ai)
. Since (G∗Z , V
∗
Z )  ∆, (G
∗
Z , V
∗
Z )  pmR(
⋂
1≤i≤n Ai)
↔
♦p⋂
1≤i≤n Ai
. Therefore (G∗Z , V
∗
Z ), s  ♦p
⋂
1≤i≤n Ai
. Thus there is a state s′ ∈ |G∗Z | such
that sSs′ and (G∗Z , V
∗
Z ), s
′  p⋂
1≤i≤n Ai
. Therefore and since (G∗Z , V
∗
Z )  ∆, it follows
that (G∗Z , V
∗
Z ), s
′  pAi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
(c) f is surjective: Let us take any ultrafilter U ∈ |ueF|. To prove surjectiveness, we
show that the set { pA |A ∈ U } is satisfiable in (G
∗
Z , V
∗
Z ). By ω-saturatedness of
(G∗Z , V
∗
Z ), it suffices to show finite satisfiability. Fix any A1, . . . , An ∈ U . It fol-
lows that
⋂
1≤k≤nAk ∈ U , and hence
⋂
1≤k≤nAk 6= ∅. Pick w ∈
⋂
1≤k≤nAk. Since
F is finitely generated by U , w is reachable (in F) from some point u ∈ U in
a finite number of steps. But then there is some l ∈ ω such that (F, V0), u 
p(mR)l(
⋂
1≤k≤n Ak)
, where V0 is the natural valuation on F sending pX to X . Since
V0 is the natural valuation, we also obtain that u ∈ (mR)l(
⋂
1≤k≤nAk), and thus ∆
contains p{u } ↔ p{u }∧p(mR)l(
⋂
1≤k≤n Ak)
. It now follows from (G∗Z , V
∗
Z ), w
∗
u  ∆F,u that
(G∗Z , V
∗
Z ), w
∗
u  p{u }. Since (G
∗
Z , V
∗
Z )  ∆, we obtain (G
∗
Z , V
∗
Z ), w
∗
u  p(mR)l(
⋂
1≤k≤n Ak)
,
and hence also that (G∗Z , V
∗
Z ), w
∗
u  ♦
lp⋂
1≤k≤n Ak
. Therefore, { pA1 , . . . , pAn } is satisfi-
able in (G∗Z , V
∗
Z ). ⊣
6. Finite Goldblatt-Thomason-style Theorem for Relative Modal definability
with Positive Universal Modality
Given a class G of frames, we say that a set of formulas defines a class F of frames within
G if, for all frames F ∈ G, the equivalence: F  ϕ ⇔ F ∈ F holds. A frame F = (W,R) is
called finite whenever W is a finite set and transitive whenever R is a transitive relation.
In what follows, let Ffintra be the class of all finite transitive frames and Ffin the class of all
finite frames.
With the help of frame constructions such as bounded morphic images, disjoint unions,
generated subframes, we first review the existing characterisations of relative ML- and
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ML(u )-definability within the class of finite transitive frames. We then give a novel char-
acterisation of relativeML(u +)-definability again within the class of finite transitive frames.
Theorem 33 (Finite Goldblatt–Thomason Theorems for ML [3] and ML(u ) [10]).
1. A class of finite transitive frames is ML-definable within the class Ffintra of all finite
transitive frames if and only if it is closed under taking bounded morphic images,
generated subframes, and disjoint unions.
2. A class of finite frames is ML(u )-definable within the class Ffin of all finite frames if
and only if it is closed under taking bounded morphic images.
In order to show the corresponding characterisation of relative definability in ML(u +),
a variant of the Jankov-Fine formula is defined.
Definition 34. Let F = (W,R) be a finite transitive frame. Put W := {w0, . . . , wn }.
Associate a new proposition variable pwi with each wi and define 
+ϕ := ϕ ∧ ϕ. The
Jankov-Fine formula ϕF,wi at wi is defined as the conjunction of all the following formulas:
1. pwi
2. (pw0 ∨ · · · ∨ pwn).
3.
∧{
+(pwi → ¬pwj ) |wi 6= wj
}
.
4.
∧{
+(pwi → ♦pwj ) | (wi, wj) ∈ R
}
.
5.
∧{
+(pwi → ¬♦pwj ) | (wi, wj) /∈ R
}
.
The Jankov-Fine formula ϕF is defined as
∨
w∈W 
u ¬ϕF,w.
We note that the Jankov-Fine formula ϕF,wi at wi is an ML-formula and thus the
Jankov-Fine formula ϕF is an ML(u
+)-formula.
Lemma 35. Let F = (W,R) be a finite transitive frame. For any transitive frame G, the
following are equivalent:
(i) the Jankov-Fine formula ϕF is not valid in G,
(ii) there is a finite set Y ⊆ |G| such that F is a bounded morphic image of GY , where GY
is the subframe of G generated by Y .
Proof. The direction from (ii) to (i) is immediate from the fact that ϕF is not valid in F
under the natural valuation sending pwi to {wi } (Note: validity of ML(u
+)-formulas is
closed under taking under bounded morphic images and generated subframes, see, e.g., [4,
Exercise 7.1.2] and Proposition 24). So, we focus on the converse direction.
Assume (i). It follows from G 6 ϕF that (G, V ) 6 ϕF, for some assignment V . Thus,
for each i ≤ n, there exists a point vi of G such that (G, V ), vi  ϕF,wi. Put Y :=
{ vi | 0 ≤ i ≤ n }, let GY denote the subframe of G generated by Y , and let U be the re-
duction of V into the frame GY . Since satisfaction of ML-formulas is closed under taking
generated submodels (see, e.g., [4, Prop. 2.6]), it follows that (GY , U), vi  ϕF,wi, for each
i ≤ n. Let us put GY = (GY , S). The first clause of the Jankov-Fine formula ϕF,wi implies
that, for each i ≤ n, U(pwi) 6= ∅. By the second and the third clause, we obtain
⋃
w∈W U(pw)
= GY and U(pwi) ∩ U(pwj) = ∅ for any distinct indices i and j. This enables us to define
a surjective mapping f : GY → W . Define f(v) := wi if v ∈ U(pwi). Clearly f is a well
defined surjection.
In what follows, we show that f is a bounded morphism. The condition (Forth) is
established as follows. Assume that xSy and let i, j be such that f(x) = wi and f(y) =
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wj . Thus x ∈ U(pwi) and y ∈ U(pwj ). Since GY is Y -generated, x is reachable from some
vk ∈ Y . Suppose for a contradiction that wiRwj fails in F. Then +(pwi → ¬♦pwj ) is a
conjunct in the Jankov-Fine formula ϕF,wk . Recall that (GY , U), vk  ϕF,wk . It now follows
from (GY , U), vk  
+(pwi → ¬♦pwj ) that xSy fails. A contradiction. Therefore, wiRwj
holds in F.
The condition (Back) is shown as follows. Assume that f(x)Rwj and let i be such that f(x)
= wi. From the definition of f , it follows that x ∈ U(pwi). Since GY is Y -generated, x is
reachable from some vk ∈ Y . Since wiRwj, we have that 
+(pwi → ♦pwj ) is a conjunct
in the Jankov-Fine formula ϕF,wk . Recall again that (GY , U), vk  ϕF,wk . It follows from
(GY , U), vk  
+(pwi → ♦pwj ) and x ∈ U(pwi) that there is some y such that f(y) = wj
and xSy holds, as desired.
Theorem 36. For every class F of finite transitive frames, the following are equivalent:
(i) F is ML(u +)-definable within Ffintra.
(ii) F is closed under taking generated subframes and bounded morphic images.
Proof. The direction from (i) to (ii) is easy to establish (by Proposition 24 and Theorem 33),
so we focus on the converse direction. Assume (ii). Define Log(F) =
{
ϕ ∈ML(u +) |F  ϕ
}
.
We show that Log(F) defines F within Ffintra. Fix any finite and transitive frame F ∈ Ffintra.
In what follows, we show the following equivalence:
F ∈ F ⇐⇒ F  Log(F).
The left-to-right direction is immediate, so we concentrate on the converse direction. Assume
F  Log(F). Since F is finite and transitive, let us take the Jankov-Fine formula ϕF. Since
ϕF is not valid in F, ϕF /∈ Log(F). Thus there is a transitive frame G ∈ F (recall that F is
a class of transitive frames) such that ϕF is not valid in G. By Lemma 35, there is a finite
set Y ⊆ |G| such that F is a bounded morphic image of GY . Since G ∈ F, GY ∈ F by
F’s closure under generated subframes. It follows from F’s closure under bounded morphic
images that F ∈ F, as desired.
7. Modal Logics with Team Semantics
We now turn from modal logics with Kripke semantics to modal logics in which the
semantics is defined with respect to team-pointed models. In this section we define the
team-based modal logics that are relevant for this paper. We survey basic properties and
known result concerning expressive power. Later, in Section 9, we connect these two different
semantics with respect to definability.
7.1. Basic notions of team semantics
A subset T of the domain of a Kripke model M is called a team of M. Before we
define the so-called team semantics forML, let us first introduce some notation that makes
defining the semantics simpler.
Definition 37. Let M = (W,R, V ) be a model and T and S teams of M. Define
R[T ] := {w ∈ W | ∃v ∈ T (vRw)} and R−1[T ] := {w ∈ W | ∃v ∈ T (wRv)}.
For teams T and S of M, we write T [R]S if S ⊆ R[T ] and T ⊆ R−1[S].
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Thus, T [R]S holds if and only if for every w ∈ T there exists some v ∈ S such that wRv,
and for every v ∈ S there exists some w ∈ T such that wRv. The team semantics for ML
is defined as follows. We use the symbol “|=” for team semantics instead of the symbol “”
which was used for Kripke semantics.
Definition 38. Let M be a Kripke model and T a team of M. The satisfaction relation
M, T |= ϕ for ML(Φ) is defined as follows.
M, T |= p ⇔ w ∈ V (p) for every w ∈ T .
M, T |= ¬p ⇔ w 6∈ V (p) for every w ∈ T .
M, T |= (ϕ ∧ ψ) ⇔ M, T |= ϕ and M, T |= ψ.
M, T |= (ϕ ∨ ψ) ⇔ M, T1 |= ϕ and M, T2 |= ψ for some T1 and T2
such that T1 ∪ T2 = T .
M, T |= ♦ϕ ⇔ M, T ′ |= ϕ for some T ′ such that T [R]T ′.
M, T |= ϕ ⇔ M, T ′ |= ϕ, where T ′ = R[T ].
A set Γ of formulas is valid in a model M = (W,R, V ) (in team semantics), in symbols
M |= Γ, if M, T |= ϕ holds for every team T of M and every ϕ ∈ Γ. Likewise, we say that
Γ is valid in a Kripke frame F and write F |= Γ, if (F, V ) |= Γ hold for every valuation V .
When Γ is a singleton {ϕ }, we simply write M |= ϕ and F |= ϕ.
The formulas of ML have the following flatness property, see, e.g., [7].
Proposition 39 (Flatness). Let M be a Kripke model and T be a team of M. Then, for
every formula ϕ of ML(Φ): M, T |= ϕ iff ∀w ∈ T : M, w  ϕ.
From flatness if follows that for every model M, frame F, and formula ϕ ofML, M  ϕ
iff M |= ϕ and F  ϕ iff F |= ϕ.
Recall from Section 2.2 what it means that a set of modal formulas defines a class of
frames and models. All the related definitions can be adapted for logics with team semantics
by simply substituting  by |=.
The most important closure properties in the study of team-based logics are downward
closure, union closure, and the concept of team bisimulation.
Definition 40. Let L be some team-based modal logic, M a Kripke model, and T, S teams
of M. We say that a formula ϕ ∈ L is
1. downward closed if M, T |= ϕ, whenever M, S |= ϕ and T ⊆ S.
2. union closed if M, T ∪ S |= ϕ, whenever M, T |= ϕ and M, S |= ϕ.
A logic L is called downward closed (union closed) if every formula ϕ ∈ L is downward
closed (union closed). We say that L has the empty team property, if M, ∅ |= ϕ holds for
every model M and every formula ϕ ∈ L.
Team bisimulation and its finite approximation team k-bisimulation can be defined via
the corresponding concepts of ordinary modal logic. In the definition below, we denote by
⇄ and⇄ k the notions of bisimulation and k-bisimulation of ordinary modal logic (see, e.g.,
Definition 7 and [4, Definition 2.30]), respectively.
Definition 41. Let M, T and M′, T ′ be team-pointed Kripke models. We say that M, T
and M′, T ′ are team bisimilar, and write M, T [⇄] M′, T ′ if
1. for every w ∈ T there exist some w′ ∈ T ′ such that M, w ⇄M′, w′, and
2. for every w′ ∈ T ′ there exist some w ∈ T such that M, w ⇄M′, w′.
The team k-bisimulation relation [⇄ k] is defined analogously with ⇄ replaced by ⇄ k.
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7.2. Extensions of modal logic via connectives
We first introduce two expressive extensions of modal logic: an extension by the so-called
intuitionistic disjunction and an extension by the so-called contradictory negation. These
two logics are of great interest, since with respect to expressive power the logics subsume
all most studied team-based modal logics, in particular all of those defined in Section 7.3.
Modal logic with intuitionistic disjunction ML(>)(Φ) is obtained by extending the syn-
tax of ML(Φ) by the grammar rule ϕ ::= (ϕ>ϕ) with the following semantics:
M, T |= (ϕ6 ψ) ⇔ M, T |= ϕ or M, T |= ψ.
Modal team logic MT L(Φ) is obtained by extending the syntax of ML(Φ) by the contra-
dictory negation, i.e., the grammar rule ϕ ::= ∼ϕ with the following semantics:
M, T |= ∼ϕ ⇔ M, T 6|= ϕ.
The following theorem forML(6) was proven by Hella et al. [19] and forMT L by Kontinen
et al. [25]
Theorem 42. A class C of team-pointed Kripke models is definable by a single formula of
1. ML(6) iff C is downward closed, closed under team k-bisimulation, for some k ∈ N,
and admits the empty team property;
2. MT L iff C is closed under team k-bisimulation, for some k ∈ N.
7.3. Extensions of modal logic with atomic dependency notions
The syntaxes of modal dependence logic MDL(Φ) and extended modal dependence logic
EMDL(Φ) are obtained by extending the syntax ofML(Φ) by the following grammar rule
for each n ∈ ω:
For MDL: ϕ ::= dep(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ψ) , where ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ψ ∈ Φ.
For EMDL: ϕ ::= dep(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ψ) , where ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ψ ∈ML(Φ).
The intuitive meaning of the (modal) dependence atom dep(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ψ) is that the truth
value of the formula ψ is completely determined by the truth values of ϕ1, . . . , ϕn. The
formal definition is given below:
M, T |= dep(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ψ) ⇔ ∀w, v ∈ T :
∧
1≤i≤n
(M, {w} |= ϕi ⇔M, {v} |= ϕi)
implies (M, {w} |= ψ ⇔M, {v} |= ψ).
The syntax ofmodal inclusion logicMINC(Φ) and extended modal inclusion logic EMINC(Φ)
is obtained by extending the syntax ofML(Φ) by the following grammar rule for each n ∈ ω:
ϕ ::= ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⊆ ψ1, . . . , ψn, where ϕ1, ψ1, . . . , ϕn, ψn ∈ML(Φ).
In the additional grammar rules above forMINC, we require that the formulas ϕ1, ψ1, . . . , ϕn, ψn
are proposition symbols in Φ. The meaning of the (modal) inclusion atom ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⊆
ψ1, . . . , ψn is that the truth values that occur in a given team for the tuple ϕ1, . . . , ϕn occur
also as truth values for the tuple ψ1, . . . ψn. The formal definition is given below:
M, T |=ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⊆ ψ1, . . . , ψn
⇔ ∀w ∈ T∃v ∈ T :
∧
1≤i≤n
(M, {w} |= ϕi ⇔M, {v} |= ψi).
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With respect to expressive power the following are known, see, e.g., [7, 20]:
ML <MDL < EMDL =ML(6) <MT L
ML <MINC < EMINC <MT L.
Thus Theorem 42 holds also for EMDL. An analogous theorem for EMINC is by Hella
and Stumpf [20].
Theorem 43 ([20]). A class C of team-pointed Kripke models is definable by a single formula
of EMINC iff C is union closed, closed under team k-bisimulation, for some k ∈ N, and
admits the empty team property.
The fact that MINC < EMINC holds is known but no published proof is known by
the authors. Thus we present one here.
Proposition 44. With respect to expressive power MINC < EMINC.
Proof. For ϕ ∈ MINC({p}), let ϕ∗ denote the ML({p})-formula obtained from ϕ by
substituting each inclusion atom in ϕ by the formula (p∨¬p). Since p ⊆ p is essentially the
only inclusion atom in MINC({p}), it is easy to see that, for every ϕ ∈ MINC({p}), ϕ
and ϕ∗ are equivalent.
Let M = (W,R, V ) be a Kripke {p}-model such that W = {1, 2, 3}, R={(1,2)}, and
V (p) = {1, 2, 3}. We claim that there does not exists a MINC-formula that is equivalent
with p ⊆ ♦p. For the sake of a contradiction, assume that ψ ∈ MINC is such a formula.
Clearly M, {1, 3} |= p ⊆ ♦p and thus, by assumption, M, {1, 3} |= ψ. By our observation
above, M, {1, 3} |= ψ∗ follows. Now since ψ∗ is an ML-formula, it follows by Theorem 39
that M, {3} |= ψ∗. Thus M, {3} |= ψ and therefore M, {3} |= p ⊆ ♦p. However clearly
M, {3} 6|= p ⊆ ♦p, a contradiction.
The following proposition is proven in the same way as the analogous propositions for
first-order dependence logic [33] and inclusion logic [9].
Proposition 45 (Closure properties). The logics weaker or equal toML(6) with respect to
expressive power are downward closed. The logics weaker or equal to EMINC with respect
to expressive power are union closed.
Note that MT L is neither downward nor union closed. The modal depth of ϕ, denoted
by md(ϕ), is defined in the obvious way (for basic modal logic, see e.g., [4]); intuitionistic dis-
junction and contradictory negation are handled in the same manner as Boolean connectives.
For dependence atoms and inclusion atoms, we define that
md(dep(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn, ψ)) := max{md(ϕ1) , . . . ,md(ϕn) ,md(ψ)},
md(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⊆ ψ1, . . . , ψn) := max{md(ϕ1) ,md(ψ1) , . . . ,md(ϕn) ,md(ψn)}.
If L is a logic and k ∈ N, we write M, T ≡Lk M
′, T ′, if M, T and M′, T ′ agree on all
L-formulas ϕ with md(ϕ) ≤ k.
Theorem 46 ([25]). Let L be a team-based logic that is weaker or equal toMT L with respect
to expressive power. Then M, T [⇄ k] M
′, T ′ ⇒ M, T ≡Lk M
′, T ′.
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Logic Closure properties References
empty team team downward union
property k-bisimulation closure closure
ML X X X X [21]
ML(6) X X X [19, C. 3.6]
EMDL X X X [19, C. 4.5]
EMINC X X X [20, T. 3.10]
MT L X [25, T. 3.4]
Table 1: Characterisation of expressive powers of different team-based logics. E.g., a class C of team-pointed
Kripke models is definable by a single EMDL-formula if and only if M, ∅ ∈ C, for every M, C is closed
under the so-called team k-bisimulation, for some finite k, and C is downward closed.
{ML,MINC, EMINC} <M MDL <M {EMDL,ML(6),MT L}
{ML,MINC, EMINC} <F {MDL, EMDL,ML(6),MT L}
Table 2: Hierarchy of model and frame definability of different modal logics with team semantics. The logics
within a same set above are proven to coincide with respect to model or frame definability.
8. Modal definability in team semantics
The expressive power of the most studied team-based modal logics is quite well under-
stood. See Table 1 for the known characterisations. However the closely related topics of
definability with respect to models and with respect to frames has not been studied before.
Recall the hierarchy of the team-based logics with respect to expressive power stated
in the previous section; there are six distinct cases. In this section we show that with
respect to model definability there are only three distinct cases whereas with respect to
frame definability only two different cases remain. See Table 2 for the resulting hierarchies.
In order to show that, with respect to model definability, EMINC collapses to ML and
that MT L collapses to ML(6), we need to introduce the concepts of Hintikka types from
model theory of modal logic.
8.1. Hintikka formulas and types
It is well-known that for any finite set of proposition symbols Φ, any finite k ∈ N,
and any pointed Φ-model (M, w), there exists a modal formula of modal depth k that
characterises (M, w) completely up to k-equivalence (i.e. equivalence up to modal depth k).
These Hintikka formulas (or characteristic formulas) are defined as follows (see e.g. [12]):
Definition 47. Assume that Φ is a finite set of proposition symbols. Let k ∈ N and
let (M, w) be a pointed Φ-model. The k-th Hintikka formula χkM,w of (M, w) is defined
recursively as follows:
• χ0M,w :=
∧
{p | p ∈ Φ, w ∈ V (p)} ∧
∧
{¬p | p ∈ Φ, w 6∈ V (p)}.
• χk+1M,w := χ
k
M,w ∧
∧
v∈R[w] ♦χ
k
M,v ∧
∨
v∈R[w] χ
k
M,v.
It is easy to see that md
(
χkM,w
)
= k, and M, w  χkM,w for every pointed Φ-model
(M, w). By a straightforward inductive argument, it can be shown that χkM,w is essentially
finite. Moreover it can be shown that, for each fixed k and Φ, there exists only finitely many
non-equivalent k-th Hintikka formulas.
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Proposition 48 (see, e.g., [12]). Let Φ be a finite set of proposition symbols, k ∈ N, and
(M, w) and (M′, w′) pointed Φ-models. Then
M, w ≡MLk M
′, w′ ⇐⇒ M, w⇄ k M
′, w′ ⇐⇒ M′, w′  χkM,w.
Note that from above it follows that, up to equivalence, each pointed modelM, w satisfies
exactly one k-th Hintikka formula, namely the formula χkM,w.
Definition 49. Let M be a Kripke Φ-model and C a class of Kripke Φ-models. We define
that
tpΦk (M) :={χ
k
M,w | w is a point of M},
tpΦk (M, T ) :={χ
k
M,w | w ∈ T},
tpΦk (C) :={tp
Φ
k (M) |M ∈ C}.
Proposition 50. Let L be any team-based logic weaker than or equal to MT L w.r.t. ex-
pressive power. Then tpΦk (M, T ) = tp
Φ
k (M
′, T ′) ⇒ M, T ≡Lk M
′, T ′.
Proof. Assume that tpΦk (M, T ) = tp
Φ
k (M
′, T ′). By Proposition 48 and the definition of team
bisimulation, it follows that M, T [⇄ k] M
′, T ′. The claim now follows by Theorem 46.
8.2. Definability with respect to models
For sets of logics A and B, we write A <M B if for each L1,L2 ∈ A and L3,L4 ∈ B
it holds that L1 =M L2 <M L3 =M L4. For a singleton set {L}, we write simply L. The
objective of this section is to prove the following trichotomy:
{ML,MINC, EMINC} <M MDL <M {EMDL,ML(6),MT L}.
We will first establish that ML <M MDL <M EMDL. We will then show that ML =M
EMINC and finally that ML(6) =M MT L. Since by the work of Hella et al. [19]
EMDL =ML(>), already with respect to expressive power, the trichotomy follows.
We will first show that ML <M MDL and that MDL <M EMDL.
Proposition 51. ML <M MDL.
Proof. Let Mi = (Wi, Ri, Vi), i ≤ 2, be Φ-models such that W0 = {1, 2}, W1 = {1},
W2 = {2}, R0 = R1 = R2 = ∅, and, for each p ∈ Φ, V0(p) = V1(p) = {1}, and V2(p) = ∅. It
is easy to conclude by flatness of ML that
M0 ∈ Mod(ϕ) iff M1,M2 ∈ Mod(ϕ)
holds for every ϕ ∈ML. Thus
M0 ∈ Mod(Γ) iff M1,M2 ∈ Mod(Γ)
holds for every Γ ⊆ ML. However M1,M2 ∈ Mod(dep(p)) but M0 6∈ Mod(dep(p)). Thus
we conclude that Mod(dep(p)) is not definable in ML.
Proposition 52. MDL <M EMDL.
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Proof. Let Mi = (Wi, Ri, Vi), i ≤ 2, be Φ-models such that W0 = {1, 2}, W1 = {1},
W2 = {2}, R0 = {(1, 1)}, R1 = {(1, 1)}, R2 = ∅, and, for each p ∈ Φ, V0(p) = {1, 2},
V1(p) = {1}, and V2(p) = {2}. It is easy to conclude (see [8, Theorem 1] for details) that
M0 ∈ Mod(ϕ) iff M1,M2 ∈ Mod(ϕ)
holds for every ϕ ∈MDL. Thus
M0 ∈ Mod(Γ) iff M1,M2 ∈ Mod(Γ)
holds for every Γ ⊆ MDL. However M1,M2 ∈ Mod(dep(♦p)) but M0 6∈ Mod(dep(♦p)).
Thus we conclude that Mod(dep(♦p)) is not definable in MDL.
We continue by establishing that every EMINC-definable class of models is also defin-
able in ML.
Lemma 53. Let Φ be a finite set of proposition symbols, ϕ ∈ EMINC(Φ), and k = md(ϕ).
Then M ∈ Mod(ϕ) iff tpΦk (M) ⊆
⋃
{tpΦk (M
′) |M′ ∈ Mod(ϕ)}.
Proof. The direction from left to right is trivial. Assume then that
tpΦk (M) ⊆
⋃
{tpΦk (M
′) |M′ ∈ Mod(ϕ)} (1)
holds, and let T be an arbitrary team of M. It suffices to establish that M, T |= ϕ. From
(1) it follows that there exists some n ∈ N, models Mi ∈ Mod(ϕ), teams Si of Mi and Ti of
M, i ≤ n, such that
T1 ∪ · · · ∪ Tn = T and tp
Φ
k (Mi, Si) = tp
Φ
k (M, Ti), for each i ≤ n.
Note that such finite n exists, since tpΦk (M) is essentially finite. Since each Mi ∈ Mod(ϕ), it
follows thatMi, Si |= ϕ, for i ≤ n. Thus from Proposition 50 and the fact that tp
Φ
k (Mi, Si) =
tpΦk (M, Ti), for i ≤ n, it follows that M, Ti |= ϕ, for i ≤ n. Now, by union closure
(Theorem 45), we conclude that M, T |= ϕ.
Theorem 54. A class C of Kripke models is definable by a single EMINC-formula if and
only if the class is definable by a single ML-formula.
Proof. The if direction is trivial. For the other direction, let C be a class of Kripke models
that is definable by a single EMINC formula and let ϕ be an EMINC(Φ)-formula that
defines C. Without lose of generality, we may assume that Φ is finite. Let k denote the
modal depth of ϕ. We will show that the ML(Φ) formula
ϕ∗ :=
∨
{χkM,w |M ∈ Mod(ϕ), w ∈M}
defines C. Since over a finite set of proposition symbols there exists only finitely many
essentially different k-Hintikka-formulas, ϕ∗ is essentially a finite ML(Φ) -formula. By
assumption C = Mod(ϕ). Thus by Lemma 53
M ∈ C iff tpΦk (M) ⊆
⋃
{tpΦk (M
′) |M′ ∈ Mod(ϕ)}. (2)
Observe that by flatness (Proposition 39) and the fact that each pointed Kripke model
satisfies only its own k-Hintikka-formula
M, T |= ϕ∗ iff tpΦk (M, T ) ⊆
⋃
{tpΦk (M
′) |M′ ∈ Mod(ϕ)},
and thus it follows that
M |= ϕ∗ iff tpΦk (M) ⊆
⋃
{tpΦk (M
′) |M′ ∈ Mod(ϕ)}. (3)
From (2) and (3) the claim follows.
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The following theorem directly follow.
Theorem 55. A class C of Kripke models is EMINC-definable if and only if it is ML
definable.
Finally we show that every MT L definable class of models is also definable in ML(6).
Lemma 56. Let ϕ be and MT L-formula and k = md(ϕ). Then
M ∈ Mod(ϕ) iff tpΦk (M) ⊆ Γ ∈ tp
Φ
k
(
Mod(ϕ)
)
, for some Γ.
Proof. The direction from left to right is trivial. Assume then that tpΦk (M) ⊆ Γ ∈
tpΦk
(
Mod(ϕ)
)
holds for some Γ. Thus there exists a Kripke modelM′ such thatM′ ∈ Mod(ϕ)
and tpΦk (M
′) = Γ. For the sake of a contradiction, assume that M 6∈ Mod(ϕ). Thus there
exists a team T of M such that M, T 6|= ϕ. Since tpΦk (M) ⊆ tp
Φ
k (M
′) it follows that there
exists a team T ′ of M′ such that tpΦk (M, T ) = tp
Φ
k (M
′, T ′). Thus by Proposition 50, we
conclude that M′, T ′ 6|= ϕ. This is a contradiction and thus M ∈ Mod(ϕ) holds.
Theorem 57. A class C of Kripke models is definable in MT L by a single formula if and
only if it is definable in ML(6) by a single formula.
Proof. The fact that every class of Kripke models that is definable by a single ML(6)-
formula is also definable by a single MT L-formula follows directly by Theorem 42.
Let C be an arbitrary single formula MT L-definable class of Kripke models and let ϕ
be anMT L-formula that defines C. Let k denote the modal depth of ϕ. We will show that
the ML(6)-formula
ϕ∗ := 6
Γ∈tpΦ
k
(C)
(∨
Γ
)
defines C. Note that since tpΦk (C) is a family of sets of k-Hintikka formulas the outer
disjunction is essentially finite. Likewise, since each Γ is a collection of k-Hintikka formulas,
it follows by flatness (remember that Hintikka formulas are ML-formulas) that the inner
disjunctions are essentially finite. Thus ϕ∗ is essentially a finite ML(>)-formula.
Assume first that M ∈ C. By definition tpΦk (M) ∈ tp
Φ
k (C). Clearly, for each team T of
M, it holds that M, T |=
∨
tpΦk (M), and thus that M, T |= ϕ
∗. Therefore M |= ϕ∗. Assume
then that M |= ϕ∗. Thus M,W |= ϕ∗, where W is the domain of M. Therefore there
exists a set Γ ∈ tpΦk (C) such that M,W |=
∨
Γ. Thus tpΦk (M) = tp
Φ
k (M,W ) ⊆ Γ. Recall
that C = Mod(ϕ). Now since Γ ∈ tpΦk (C) = tp
Φ
k
(
Mod(ϕ)
)
, it follows from Lemma 56 that
M ∈ Mod(ϕ) = C.
The following theorem directly follows.
Theorem 58. A class C of Kripke models is definable in MT L if and only if it is definable
in ML(6)
Now by Propositions 51 and 52, by Theorems 55 and 58, and the fact that EMDL =M
ML(>) [19], we obtain the following trichotomy.
Theorem 59. {ML,MINC, EMINC} <M MDL <M {EMDL,ML(6),MT L}.
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8.3. Definability with respect to frames
We now shift from model definability to frame definability. The objective of this section
is to establish that the trichotomy of model definability (Theorem 59) can be strengthened
to the following dichotomy of frame definability.
{ML,MINC, EMINC} <F {MDL, EMDL,ML(6),MT L}.
It is easy to show that equality with respect to =M implies equality with respect to =F :
Lemma 60. Let L and L′ be logics such that L =M L′. Then L =F L′.
Proof. By symmetry it suffices to show that L ≤F L′. Let F be a Kripke frame, ϕ an
L-formula and ϕ∗ the related L′-formula such that Mod(ϕ) = Mod(ϕ∗). Now, by definition,
F |= ϕ if and only if (F, V ) |= ϕ for every valuation V . Since Mod(ϕ) = Mod(ϕ∗), this
holds if and only if (F, V ) |= ϕ∗ for every valuation V , which by definition holds if and only
if F |= ϕ∗. Now let F be some L-definable class of Kripke frames and let Γ be a set of
L-formulas that defines F. Define Γ∗ := {ϕ∗ | ϕ ∈ Γ}. Clearly Γ∗ is a set of L′-formulas
that defines F.
The only thing that is left to show is that with respect to frame definability MDL and
EMDL conicide.
Proposition 61. Let Φ be an infinite set of proposition symbols. For every formula ϕ ∈
EMDL(Φ) there exists a formula ϕ∗ ∈ MDL(Φ) such that F |= ϕ iff F |= ϕ∗ for every
frame F.
Proof. We give a sketch of the proof here. A similar proof is given in [35, Proposition 5.8].
The translation ϕ 7→ ϕ∗ is defined inductively in the following way. For (negated) proposition
symbols the translation is the identity. For propositional connectives and modalities we
define
(ψ1 ⊕ ψ2) 7→ (ψ
∗
1 ⊕ ψ
∗
2), and ∇ψ 7→ ∇ψ
∗,
where ⊕ ∈ {∧,∨} and ∇ ∈ {♦,}. The only nontrivial case is the case for the dependence
atoms. Let ϕ be the dependence atom dep(ψ1, . . . , ψn), let k be the modal depth of ϕ, and
let p1, . . . , pn be distinct fresh proposition symbols. Define
ϕ∗ :=
( ∧
0≤i≤k
i
∧
1≤j≤n
(pj ↔ ψj)
)
→ dep(p0, . . . , pn) .
It is now straightforward to show that the claim follows.
Now from Theorem 59, Lemma 60, and Proposition 61, we obtain the desired dichotomy.
Theorem 62. {ML,MINC, EMINC} <F {MDL, EMDL,ML(6),MT L}.
9. Connecting team semantics and universal modality
Recall the model theoretic characterisations of model definability and frame definability
for ML, i.e., Theorems 8, 28, and 33. By Theorems 59 and 62, we directly obtain the
corresponding characterisations for MINC and EMINC. Now recall the corresponding
characterisations for ML(u +), i.e., Theorems 16, 32, and 36. In this section we will show
that with respect to model and frame definability ML(u +) and ML(6) coincide. Thus
we obtain model theoretic characterisations of model definability for EMDL, ML(6) and
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Logic Closure under Elementary References
disjoint surjective total surjective
unions bisimulations bisimulations
ML X X X X [6]
MINC Thm. 55
EMINC Thm. 55
ML(u +) X X X Cor. 17
ML(6) Thm. 68
EMDL Thm. 59
MT L Thm. 59
ML(u ) X X [28]
Table 3: Characterisation of model definability of different modal logics. Note that total surjectice bisimu-
lations are special cases of surjective bisimulations. E.g., a class C of Kripke models is definable in EMDL
if and only if C is elementary, and closed under surjective bisimulations.
Logic Closure under Reflects References
disjoint bounded mor- generated ultrafilter finitely gene-
unions phic images subframes extensions rated subframes
ML X X X X X2 [11]
MINC Thm. 62
EMINC Thm. 62
ML(u +) Thm. 32
ML(6) Thm. 69
MDL X X X X Thm. 62
EMDL Thm. 62
MT L Thm. 62
ML(u ) X X [13, Cor. 3.9]
Table 4: Characterisation of frame definability of different modal logics with respect to first-order definable
frame classes. E.g., an elementary class F of Kripke frames is definable in EMDL if and only if F is
closed under taking generated subframes and bounded morphic images, and reflects ultrafilter extensions
and finitely generated subframes.
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Logic Closure under References
disjoint bounded morphic generated
unions images subframes
ML X X X [3]
MINC Theorem 62
EMINC Theorem 62
ML(u +) Theorem 36
ML(6) Theorem 69
MDL X X Theorem 62
EMDL Theorem 62
MT L Theorem 62
ML(u )3 X [10]
Table 5: Characterisation of relative frame definability of different modal logics within the class of finite
transitive frames. E.g., a class F of finite transitive frames is definable in EMDL within the class of finite
transitive frames if and only if F is closed under taking generated subframes and bounded morphic images.
MT L. Similarly we obtain model theoretic characterisations of frame definability forMDL,
EMDL, ML(6) and MT L. See Tables 3-5 for an overview of the characterisations.
We start with a normal form for ML(6).
Definition 63. We say that anML(>)-formula ϕ is in >-normal form if ϕ = ψ1 >ψ2 > . . .>ψn
for some n ∈ ω and ψ1, ψ2, . . . , ψn ∈ ML(Φ).
Proposition 64 (>-normal form, [35, 36]). For every ML(>)-formula ϕ there exists an
equivalent formula in >-normal form.
Lemma 65. For every ML-formula ϕ and model M: M  u ϕ iff M,W |= ϕ.
Proof. By the semantics of u , M  u ϕ iff M, w  ϕ for every w ∈ W . Furthermore by
Proposition 39, M, w  ϕ for every w ∈ W iff M,W |= ϕ.
Lemma 66. For every ML(>)-formula ϕ there exists a formula ϕ− ∈
∨
u ML such that
M |= ϕ iff M  ϕ− for every Kripke model M.
Proof. Let ϕ be an arbitrary ML(>)-formula. By Proposition 64, we may assume that
ϕ = ψ1 > · · ·>ψn, for some n ∈ ω and ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ ML. Let M = (W,R, V ) be an
arbitrary model. It suffices to show M |= ϕ ⇔ M  u ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨ u ψn. This is shown as
follows.
M |= ϕ
Def. of |=
Proposition 45
⇔ M,W |= ψ1 > · · ·>ψn
Def. of >
⇔ There exists i ≤ n: M,W |= ψi
Lemma 65
⇔ There exists i ≤ n: M  u ψi
Defs. of , u and ∨
⇔ M  u ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨u ψn.
2If a class of frames is closed under disjoint unions and bounded morphic images then it reflects finitely
generated subframes.
3The characterisation for ML(u ) holds already within the class of finite frames
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Lemma 67. For every ϕ ∈
∨
u ML there exists an ML(>)-formula ϕ∗ such that M  ϕ
iff M |= ϕ∗ for every Kripke model M.
Proof. Let ϕ ∈
∨
u ML be an arbitrary formula, i.e., ϕ = u ψ1∨ · · ·∨u ψn for some n ∈ ω
and ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ ML. Let M = (W,R, V ) be an arbitrary Kripke model. It suffices to
show M  ϕ ⇔ M |= ψ1 > · · ·>ψn. We proceed as follows.
M  u ψ1 ∨ · · · ∨u ψn
Defs. of , u, and ∨
⇔ There exists i ≤ n: M  u ψi
Lemma 65
⇔ There exists i ≤ n: M,W |= ψi.
Def. of >
⇔ M,W |= ψ1 > · · ·>ψn
Proposition 45
⇔ M |= ψ1 > · · ·>ψn.
Theorem 68. A class C of Kripke models is ML(>)-definable iff it is ML(u +)-definable.
Proof. Let C be a class of Kripke models. By Proposition 12, it suffices to show that C is
ML(>)-definable iff it is
∨
u ML-definable. “If” and “Only If” parts follow directly from
Lemma 66 and Lemma 67, respectively.
The following theorem then directly follows via Lemma 60.
Theorem 69. A frame class F is ML(>)-definable iff it is ML(u +)-definable.
We are finally ready to combine our results concerning model and frame definability of
team-based modal logics and modal logics with the universal modality. By Propositions 18
and 25, and Theorems 59, 62, 68, and 69, we obtain the following strict hierarchies.
Theorem 70. With respect to model and frame definability, we have the following hierar-
chies:
{ML,MINC, EMINC} <M MDL <M {EMDL,ML(6),ML(u
+),MT L} <M ML(u )
{ML,MINC, EMINC} <F {MDL, EMDL,ML(6),ML(u
+),MT L} <F ML(u ).
We can now extend the characterisations of model and frame definability (i.e., Theorems
8, 16, 28, 32, 33, and 36) to cover also team-based logics.
Corollary 71. For every logic L ∈ {ML,MINC, EMINC} and every class C of Kripke
models, the following are equivalent:
(i) C is L-definable.
(ii) C is closed under surjective bisimulations, disjoint unions and ultraproducts, and C is
closed under ultrapowers.
(iii) C is elementary and closed under surjective bisimulations and disjoint unions.
Corollary 72. For every logic L ∈ {ML(u +), EMDL,ML(6),MT L} and every class C
of Kripke models, the following are equivalent:
(i) C is L-definable.
(ii) C is closed under surjective bisimulations and ultraproducts, and C is closed under
ultrapowers.
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(iii) C is elementary and closed under surjective bisimulations.
Corollary 73. For every logic L ∈ {ML,MINC, EMINC} and for every elementary
frame class F, the following are equivalent:
(i) F is L-definable.
(ii) F is closed under taking bounded morphic images, generated subframes, disjoint unions
and reflects ultrafilter extensions.
Corollary 74. For every logic L ∈ {ML(u +),MDL, EMDL,ML(>)} and for every
elementary frame class F, the following are equivalent:
(i) F is L-definable.
(ii) F is closed under taking generated subframes and bounded morphic images, and reflects
ultrafilter extensions and finitely generated subframes.
Corollary 75. For every logic L ∈ {ML,MINC, EMINC} and every class F of finite
transitive frames, the following are equivalent:
(i) F is L-definable within Ffintra.
(ii) F is closed under taking bounded morphic images, generated subframes, and disjoint
unions.
Corollary 76. For every logic L ∈ {ML(u +),MDL, EMDL,ML(>)} and every class F
of finite transitive frames, the following are equivalent:
(i) F is L-definable within Ffintra.
(ii) F is closed under taking generated subframes and bounded morphic images.
10. Conclusion
In this paper we studied model and frame definability of different modal logics. The
first half of this article considered the extension of modal logic with the universal modality
whereas the second half concetrated in modal logics with team semantics. We showed that
with respect to model and frame definability a strict linear hierarchy between all of the logics
studied here emerge, respectively. With respect to model definability we have four distinct
cases, whereas in frame definability only three remain, see Theorem 70 for the hierarchies.
Moreover, we gave model theoretic characterisations for model definabity (see Table 3) and
frame definability; restricted to elementary classes and to the class of finite transitive frames
(see Tables 4 and 5, respectively).
Note that our results imply that with respect to model definability every logic be-
tween EMDL and MT L coincide. Similarly, with respect to frame definability, every
logic between MDL and MT L coincide. In particular, we obtain results concerning
modal independence logic MIL and extended modal independence logic EMIL (for def-
initions see [26]), since with respect to expressive power MDL ≤ MIL ≤ MT L and
EMDL ≤ EMIL ≤MT L.
We conclude with some open questions:
• Where does MIL lie with respect to model definability?
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• Is there some natural fragment of ML(u +) that coincides with MDL or MIL with
respect to model definability?
• Can we give model theoretic characterisations for model definability of MDL and
MIL?
• Can we use the notion of local bounded morphism (cf. [2]) to drop the requirement of
transitivity from Theorem 36?
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